Decision-making structures in large organizations were built for efficiency and core operations, not for the messy, uncertain work of building what's next.
Peter Roeber (Director of Venture Development at Gore Fabrics), Christoph Raethke (angel investor and previously at BASF Chemovator), and Daniel Benitez (Innovation and Venture Strategy lead at Veralto) unpack the disconnects between corporate governance and venture needs, the misapplication of core business logic, and underutilization of entrepreneurial experience.
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The Misapplication of Decision Processes
Distinguish search from scale
The underlying strain in corporate innovation arises when organizations apply the wrong operating model to the wrong type of problem. Daniel states the issue plainly: businesses are designed to be "very good at operations." The core focus is driving efficiency, applying specific tools to optimize everything that moves, and maximizing return on capital by moving fast.
In the core business, you know the landscape. You know "where all the dead bodies are in all the closets," you know the pitfalls, and you understand the risks. Because you know the risks, you can build processes to minimize them while moving at speed.
The systemic issue emerges when leadership transfers that same mindset and toolkit to "transformation and adjacent markets." In these spaces, you do not know the risks. Critically, "you don't know what you don't know."
When you apply an efficiency-based, risk-averse core process to a venture that requires discovery, you miss critical blind spots. You might rush to develop a product using a "fast" process, only to realize at the very end that you "don't have the right to solve that customer problem" or lack the necessary sales channel.
The symptom of this mismatch is mediocrity. Your core product development suffers because you are distracted, and your adjacent innovation fails to produce results because you applied a "scale" mindset to a "search" problem.
Daniel distinguishes these as two distinct modes requiring different leadership behaviors:
Search Phase (Innovation/Transformation): The goal is to identify and remove risks through fast learning cycles. The leader's role is to ask, "What is it that you don't know?" and "How do you know that you have learned everything that you need to know?" The objective is to learn fast, fail fast, and walk away from bad ideas before scaling.
Scale Phase (Core/Execution): The goal is efficiency and reliability. The leader's role is to remove barriers and drive accountability to ship the product reliably. Here, failure is not an option in the same way, because the risks are understood.
Daniel stresses the root cause: "The problem in this process is not the team... the problem is me being a leader and not having clarity on what I’m expecting the teams to do."
If a leader sets the wrong objectives for the wrong space—asking execution questions during a search phase—they set the team for failure.
The Missing Entrepreneurial "Access"
Move beyond knowledge to practice and skin in the game
Christoph identifies a structural void in corporate innovation. The models exist, and the theory is available. But moving past the surface, the missing element is "practice" and "access." If data is the new oil, Christoph posits that "entrepreneurial experience is the new gas or the new wind power."
The startup world runs on "access to resources that are non-obvious," access to levers, and unfair advantages that cannot be bought or learned in a classroom. Notably, in the corporate world, entrepreneurs are often relegated to roles like mentors, figureheads, or inspiring speakers.
Christoph argues they have a "right to be CEOs," "angels," and board members. They need to be the driving force behind ventures. This is about "skin in the game." "If I like a corporate venture, I want to be able to put my angel money into it."
He illustrates this with the example of Chemovator at BASF. This program was radical because important decisions were made by a "council of entrepreneurs" who were still active in the market—running startups and raising rounds. They had not become consultants; they were "still in the thick of it."
This setup allowed for:
True Access: Connecting corporate ventures with external founders, specialized talent (like CEOs who know how to fundraise), and investor networks.
Ruthless Prioritization: Entrepreneurs reserve the right to "only work on stuff that doesn't waste your time." They killed teams that lacked potential, something corporate governance often struggles to do.
External Investment: Ventures were able to attract external VC funding and spin out, preserving companies that "otherwise would have been lost to the corporation."
Importantly, Christoph questions the corporate desire for inclusivity in innovation; you should "only work with the willing and don't drag along the unwilling."
In the startup world, you double down on the motivated; you do not try to educate everyone. You create an environment where the willing can succeed, even if that means being really strict about not admitting everyone.
The "Waiting for Clarity" Paradox
Accept the system and adapt through small, intentional nudges
Peter highlights a critical gap between what ventures need and what the corporate system provides: "Corporate ventures require dedicated C-suite mind space and partnership to succeed."
The systemic blockage appears as a paradox. Leadership teams are primarily focused on the core business. They often believe they are providing sufficient support, even when they aren't. This gap remains invisible until a venture progresses to a point where it needs a "meaningful increase in investment."
At this moment, the need becomes urgent. Attention shifts to the venture. However, leadership often lacks the "depth of understanding required to make confident and timely decisions." They perceive the risk as too high because they haven't been on the journey.
The result is "waiting for clarity, without creating it." Leadership either kills the effort due to perceived risk or postpones the decision. When they revisit it later, the knowledge gap still exists, the risk still looks high, and the venture is eventually stopped.
Ventures need investment to reduce uncertainty, and leadership needs reduced uncertainty to invest.
Peter’s solution lies in Acceptance and Adaptation.
Acceptance: Acknowledge that this paradox is the "natural result of the current system." It isn't personal. Accepting that you will not get the ideal level of mind space from the C-suite allows you to stop fighting reality.
Adaptation: Instead of trying to transform the whole environment, use "small nudges."
Peter adapted the system by creating a "lightweight leadership governance structure." This included:
Broader enterprise leadership
External experts to fill experience gaps ("scars") that the internal team lacked
This configuration provided "trusted expertise and credibility" that supported leadership. It distributed the partnership requirements and enabled leadership to make "confident and timely decisions" rather than postponing them.
Peter highlights looking for high-leverage interventions: "Identify the levers that have the biggest impact... with the least amount of effort." This might mean finding one stakeholder who can act as a "closer champion" or advocate to the rest, rather than trying to convince everyone individually.
Applying solutions to specific organizational challenges
Organizations face specific friction points when implementing these principles. The tension around hiring for ventures reveals the first pressure point.
Hiring For Ventures Vs. Corporate HR Policies
Corporate HR policies seek generalist talent (strong engineering, strong IT), while "the venture needs are very unique." According to Peter, "You can't take the time organizationally to build that internal knowledge. You need to be able to hire specific knowledge specific to the venture, to be able to move at speed and pace."
Christoph confirms: this is critical. At Chemovator, "it became necessary to hire for the skill gaps... by offering really skilled people, often from the network of the entrepreneurs of my network too." He notes that "very few of the corporate people who started the journey were still there when external funding through VC was found." However, "from the perspective of the corporation, they still got what they wanted: 25 to 40% equity in a company that worked and secured external finance."
Folding Ventures Back Into the Core
When a venture needs to be integrated back into the core business, friction surfaces because stakeholders want to be engaged in all aspects of that venture, as it will eventually be on their plate.
Daniel describes this as essentially an acquisition: "you are dealing with different cultures... The only way forward is the way of the large corporation. It is very clear who buys who." Large corporations "should be good at doing the integration and the scale up," as "that's not new to corporations who have bought other companies."
Acceptance Without Compromise
Peter clarifies that "acceptance does not mean compromise." Rather, "acceptance is really understanding how to solve the polarity where both needs that are in tension can be satisfied." Find "the levers that have the biggest impact... with the least amount of effort."
Leadership Clarity On Search Vs. Scale
Daniel reinforces his core message: "When the leader sets the wrong objectives for the wrong space and is asking the wrong questions depending on the problem that they're facing, they just set the team up for failure, and the result is mediocrity." The solution is clear leadership that understands whether teams are in search mode (learning and de-risking) or scale mode (executing with efficiency).
Preparing for Specialized Structures
The path forward requires a fundamental rethinking of how corporate innovation operates.
The distinction between "search" (innovation) and "scale" (core) must become structural reality, not an aspirational mindset. Daniel's approach at Veralto—maintaining separate organizations with separate goals—points to what may become standard practice.
Christoph's Chemovator model signals a talent evolution: hiring generalist corporate managers for high-risk ventures will give way to structures where external entrepreneurs hold equity and bring "non-obvious" access to resources.
Peter's governance approach suggests innovation leaders will become infrastructure architects, designing bespoke mechanisms rather than forcing ventures through standardized approvals.
Finally, this model may evolve into something more selective—elite units where participation is earned and resources concentrate on creating winners.
